Wednesday, August 28, 2019

State can bring nuisance claim vs. opioid makers


By Eric T. Berkman

Judge Alice Gibney
The state could bring a public nuisance claim against a group of pharmaceutical companies for their actions in promoting and distributing opioids in Rhode Island, a Superior Court judge has ruled.

The defendant drug makers and distributors argued in a motion to dismiss that the state did not plead facts sufficient to allege that they unreasonably interfered with a right common to the general public and were in control of the instrumentality of nuisance at the time the nuisance allegedly occurred.
Judge Alice B. Gibney disagreed and denied their motion.

“[A]s the State has acknowledged, the opioid crisis has been defined as an epidemic by both public health experts and the federal government,” Gibney wrote. “Accordingly, the Court finds that the State has properly identified the opioid crisis as a public right under Rhode Island law, and more specifically, the Court agrees that freedom from an overabundance of prescription opioids is a public right.”

Additionally, Gibney said, “the Court finds that reasonable minds could infer that the actions of Manufacturers and Distributors could have caused the current opioid crisis that plagues Rhode Island.”

The 44-page decision is State v. Purdue Pharma L.P., et al., Lawyers Weekly No. 61-088-19. The full text of the ruling can be found here.

“The opioid epidemic has had a devastating effect on people in Rhode Island and across the country,” Attorney General Peter F. Neronha, whose office brought the case, stated in a press release. “The people of Rhode Island deserve their day in court, and we intend to move this case forward as expeditiously as possible.”

Joseph V. Cavanaugh III of Providence, who represented McKesson Corp., one of the distributors named in the lawsuit, declined to comment. Attorneys for other defendants could not be reached for comment prior to deadline.

Public health crisis

According to the state’s complaint, defendant Purdue Pharma, which developed the controversial opioid OxyContin in the mid-1990s as a pain medicine, aggressively marketed the product to Rhode Island physicians while misrepresenting its risk of addiction, all in an effort to get providers to prescribe it to more patients, thereby generating increased profits for the company.

In 2007, Purdue and three of its executives pleaded guilty to federal criminal charges related to their deceptive marketing of the drug and had to reimburse Rhode Island for $1.2 million in costs incurred by the state Medicaid program.

In its plea agreement, Purdue admitted to falsely promising that opioid addiction occurred in less than 1 percent of patients and that opioids were not addictive when legitimately prescribed.

After the plea agreement, however, Purdue allegedly continue to mislead providers and the public about the drug, spending hundreds of millions of dollars promoting its use through continuing medical education seminars, advertising, and in-person sales calls, while publishing materials that allegedly continued to trivialize its risk of addiction and overstate its benefits.

Meanwhile, Purdue allegedly failed to report suspicious prescribing of its product despite having information, through its reimbursement program, about where its drugs were going as they progressed from wholesalers to retailers and down the supply chain.

Purdue and defendant Insys Therapeutics, the manufacturer of an addictive fentanyl-based painkiller, also allegedly had access to prescribing data and failed to report suspicious orders or retailers beginning in 2014. Insys in particular allegedly paid doctors to prescribe its product, Subsys, which was approved only for cancer patients, while persuading commercial payors to cover the drug for non-approved uses.

As a result, the state alleges, prescriptions in Rhode Island exceeded the national average in opioid prescriptions, reaching a high in 2012 of 83 prescriptions per 100 people and costing the Medical Assistance Program more than $6 million in prescriptions.

In that context, various distributors of the drugs engaged in allegedly illegal efforts to ensure pharmacies could distribute enough opioids to satisfy the heightened demand among patients.

Ultimately, that resulted in what the state characterizes as a public-health crisis with a skyrocketing overdose rate that puts Rhode Island fifth in the nation and with a 300 percent increase in overdose fatalities from 2011 to 2016. The state also alleges that the increased volume of prescribing, allegedly driven by the defendants’ efforts, correlated to black markets for diverted prescription opioids as well as a rise in heroin and fentanyl abuse by those who could no longer legally obtain — or afford — prescription opioids.

In June 2018, the state sued Purdue, Insys and several distributors in Superior Court, alleging that their campaign to unlawfully promote and distribute opioids in Rhode Island constituted public nuisance, violations of the state False Claims Act, fraud, negligence and unjust enrichment.

The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Meanwhile, this past June, the state voluntarily dismissed all claims against Insys.

Public right

Gibney rejected the defendants’ argument that the state had failed to adequately plead the elements of public nuisance under Rhode Island law.

She pointed out that the Rhode Island Supreme Court, in its 2008 decision in State v. Lead Industries Association, Inc., defined public nuisance as the unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public by someone with control over the instrumentality of nuisance at the time the harm occurred.

With respect to the first element, interference with a public right, Gibney said the Supreme Court, in Lead Industries, looked to the Restatement of Torts to draw the line between a public right and an aggregation of private rights.

Under the Restatement, Gibney noted, the interests of an entire community can be threatened by a danger to even one individual, as in the case of one person being infected with smallpox creating the risk of an epidemic.

Because both public health experts and the federal government had defined the opioid crisis as an epidemic, Gibney continued, the state satisfied the first element.

The judge also found that the state properly alleged control by the defendants over the instrumentality of nuisance, namely opioids.

“The State … frames the nuisance as the opioid epidemic itself, rather than specific instances of individuals being harmed by use or misuse of opioid pharmaceuticals [and] alleges that the nuisance was ongoing as Manufacturers and Distributors continued to misrepresent the risks and benefits of opioids, funnel excessive amounts of medicines into Rhode Island communities, and falsely promote and distribute these medicines generally,” Gibney wrote.

Viewing the disputed facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Gibney said she found the manufacturers and distributors were in control of “the instrumentality of the nuisance at the time of its occurrence.”

Gibney further determined that the state had, contrary to the defendants’ assertions, alleged sufficient facts for “reasonable minds” to infer that their actions caused Rhode Island’s opioid crisis.

Accordingly, she concluded that the state properly alleged that “the Defendants committed an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public, that the Defendants were in control of the instrumentality at the time the nuisance occurred, and that Defendants’ conduct caused the public nuisance.”

COURT: Providence Superior Court
ISSUE: Could the state bring a public nuisance claim against a group of pharmaceutical companies stemming from the promotion and distribution of opioids in Rhode Island?
DECISION: Yes

Retirement – Deferred compensation

Superior Court


Where the plaintiffs, three former Johnston police officers who retired due to injuries sustained in the line of duty, have requested a declaratory judgment regarding the ownership of funds that had been deposited in accounts organized under §457 of the Internal Revenue Code, the plaintiffs have a property right to the funds in the accounts.

“… Specifically, the parties are in dispute over the 6% of each of these officers’ salaries that the officers voluntarily deferred when they began serving in the police force, as well as the 12% match promised by the Town in return for employees foregoing such compensation in the short term. …

“The plan at issue is a §457 deferred compensation plan. …

“… [T]he I.R.C. and the Deferred Compensation Agreement require that the Town pay the police officers the compensation they earned through their service to the Town. …”

Faella, et al. v. Town of Johnston, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 61-092-19) (31 pages) (Silverstein, J.) (Providence Superior Court) Scoot K. Demello, Michael J. Lepizzera and Timothy J. Robenhymer for the plaintiffs; William J. Conley Jr., Gina Lemay and Andrew S. Cormier for the defendants (C.A. Nos. PB-2010-0311 and 0060) (Aug. 22, 2019).


Click here to read the full text of the opinion.

Cross-examination and the three C’s of impeachment


By F. Dennis Saylor IV and Daniel I. Small

For this column, we’ll turn things over to Dan for some thoughts on impeaching witnesses.

Could it be? Did you hear it right? You look discreetly at your co-counsel, and her efforts to mask a look of surprise and elation confirms it: The other side’s key witness just directly contradicted something he said in his deposition. It’s the kind of adrenaline rush that trial lawyers live for.
Then a hint of panic creeps in with the surprise. What do I do now?

First, don’t risk offending the judge or jury, or alerting opposing counsel, by demonstrations of glee. Keep your poker face throughout the trial, no matter what. Be patient and wait for cross-examination. You’ll get your turn.

And don’t forget your common sense and what you’re trying to achieve. Trials are about persuasion — ideally, dramatic persuasion. You want to maximize the drama and the clarity of the contradiction. That’s where the “three C’s” of impeachment come in:  commit, credit and confront.

1.              Commit. Trials can be long and complicated. The witness may have made the statement that you want to impeach hours or even days ago. Make it fresh and clear to the jury by repeating it. At the same time, you are locking the witness into the statement, trying to prevent him from wiggling out, once confronted, by claiming confusion or mistake. The simplest way is just to ask:

“On direct, you testified X?”

Sometimes, you don’t care which version is true; you just want to show the jury the witness can’t keep his story straight. However, if you believe the version on direct was false, don’t let the witness repeat it without making that clear to the jury. Instead of the neutral question above, ask something like:

“So, your story on direct was X?”

“You want the jury to believe X?”

Don’t give up until the witness has either committed to, or backed off from, the statement.

2.              Credit. Assuming the earlier statement is the one you prefer, you want to give it as much weight and credibility as possible and try to anticipate and block any effort to explain or waffle. Don’t just focus on the prior statement itself; set it in context.

For example, as we pointed out in our last column, if it’s a statement from a deposition, ask questions about the deposition process — that the witness had a chance to prepare, his lawyer was at his side, he took an oath to tell the truth, and so on.

But a word of caution: Slow down. Lawyers too often jump too fast to the document. Remember the bigger picture: The issue is not the document; it’s whether the original statement was correct, or maybe just whether the witness is a liar. Many times — depending on the issue and the level of certainty — you can confront the witness with the fact and only then make a decision whether to bring in the prior statement. In other words, rather than rushing to ask:

“In your prior statement, you said the light was green?”

Maybe you should start with:

“The light was green, wasn’t it?”

Sometimes on cross-examination you ask questions when you don’t care what the answer is. It can go either way. Maybe the witness will give in and give it to you. If not, then you can decide whether to use the prior statement, and hopefully show that you were right all along.

Think, too, about sequencing. Sometimes, if the “credit” is going to take a while, you may want to put it first, so as not to create too long a gap between “commit” and “confront.” If there are multiple uses for the prior statement, maybe “credit” it early. I have had cross-examinations in which the very first thing I did was credit the prior statement and leave a copy in front of the witness.

3.              Confront. Now that you’ve locked in the current testimony and the weight of the prior statement, confront the witness with the inconsistency. Again, don’t be in a hurry. It’s not about the piece of paper. You don’t have to show the document right away. Instead, you might ask:
“In fact, in that sworn deposition, you said something completely different than your story today?”
“In your sworn deposition, you said X?”

Don’t paraphrase or summarize; quote the prior statement precisely. If you do, whatever the answer is, you’re happy:

“Yes” — Great, you won the point!

“No” — Confront with the transcript.

“I don’t recall” — Refresh with the transcript.

To confront effectively, give the witness a copy, display it to the jury if allowed, then read it out loud and ask the witness if you read it correctly.

Then consider other ways to emphasize the prior statement. Do you want to try to offer it as an exhibit? To blow it up either electronically or on poster board? By itself, or comparing the two statements? Technology in the courtroom creates even more potential for drama. Use the monitors. Underline or highlight the prior statement.

Consider carefully the point you want to make, or whether there even is a point. I once observed a lawyer go on at length, impeaching a minor witness on a minor conflict from a prior statement. When I asked counsel later what his theme was with that witness, the answer was, “Oh, nothing really. He didn’t hurt me at all.” Really? Then why impeach? Why not just say, “No questions!” 

Finally, remember that impeachment alone isn’t the only goal. Under the right circumstances, you can turn a “mere” prior inconsistent statement into something more — a demonstration that your side (and by extension, you the lawyer) are a credible and reliable source of the truth.

Previous installments of Tried & True can be found at rilawyersweekly.com. Judge F. Dennis Saylor IV sits on the U.S. District Court in Boston. Prior to his appointment to the bench, he was a federal prosecutor and an attorney in private practice. Daniel I. Small is a partner in the Boston and Miami offices of Holland & Knight. He is a former federal prosecutor and teaches CLE programs across the country.